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Screening for symptoms of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in airline passengers 
whose journey originated from the three most-affected countries – Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone – has recently been introduced at selected airports in 
the UK and the USA.1,2 Screening can include health declarations, visual 
inspection and thermography to detect symptoms.  The effectiveness of border 
screening for other infectious diseases has been considered before, but its role in 
preventing EVD importation is unknown.3-5 A recent paper estimated the 
efficiency of entry screening for airline passengers, but did not consider the 
influence of the natural history of EVD and journey duration on screening 
efficacy.6  
 
EVD has a mean (standard deviation) incubation period of 9.4 (7.4) days from 
infection to symptoms developing, and a mean “symptomatic period” (from 
symptom onset to hospitalization) of 5.0 (4.7) days.7 We simulated the timing of 
infection and development of symptoms for 200 travellers, and related this to 
the travel duration and success of detection through exit screening, as travellers 
leave West Africa, and through entry screening, on arrival at destinations. For 
individuals infected at a random time prior to departure, incubation and 
symptomatic periods were drawn randomly and independently from the 
periods’ distributions.7 We assumed that screening would detect all symptomatic 
individuals, and that incubating and symptomatic individuals are equally likely 
to attempt to travel. 
 
We found exit screening would detect 35.6% (simulated 95% quantile: 23.6% to 
48.2%) of infected passengers (Figure 1). The additional benefit of entry 
screening increased with journey time. After a 24 hour journey, entry screening 
would increase the overall detection to 41.5% (28.8% to 55.1%) of those 
infected; thus detecting an additional 6.9% (1.2% to 14.0%) of infected 
individuals. For 12 hour journeys from West Africa, which are typical for flights 
to Europe, arrival screening would detect an additional 3.4% (0% to 9.3%) of 
infected passengers. While we have considered the effectiveness of screening 
travellers from the affected region, the detection patterns would differ for 
travellers from settings where hospital admittance may occur earlier during 
infection. 
 
By the end of September 2014, EVD had been unwittingly transported by two 
airline passengers: one to Nigeria and one to the USA. Based on the current case 
number doubling time in Liberia of 23.6 days,7 if the epidemic in West Africa is 
not curtailed and there is no change in international travel patterns, we would 
expect an additional 29 such infected passengers to have attempted to fly 
internationally from West Africa by December 31st 2014. Of these, ten (7 to 14) 
would be prevented from travel by exit screening. Based on previous flight 
patterns (OAG, total adjusted bookings for July 2014)8 we would expect 7% (~1-
2 people) and 13% (~2-3 people) of the remaining infected individuals to fly to 
the UK and USA respectively. Given the additional detection by entry screening 
and the percentage of travellers arriving at screening airports in these countries 
(75% and 78% respectively at present), current entry screening procedures 
would be expected to identify 0 or 1 additional cases in each country between 
October 1st and December 31st, in the UK, 1 to 2, and in the USA, 1 to 3 would not 
be detected at entry but might be detected subsequently be daily follow-up. 
Based on estimated passenger numbers flying to USA and UK (20,739 and 11,073 
respectively) for this period, the efficiency of entry screening to detect a single 
case would be 0.004% for the USA and 0.009% for the UK. Recent reports 
suggest exit screening within the affected countries is currently 0.21% effective. 
9 
 
In addition to identifying those infected, entry screening allows health 
authorities to provide health information to passengers arriving from West 
Africa, describes actions to take if they become unwell, and facilitates follow-up. 
Although our analysis shows entry screening will reduce the overall chances of 
Ebola being brought into a country, the most effective way of restricting its 
global spread is to control the disease at source in West Africa. 
(649 words, 1 figure) 
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Figure 1 Simulated percentage of passengers infected with Ebola virus that were 
detected by screening at exit (blue), at entry (yellow), and at both exit and entry 
(red). Pale shaded regions denote the 95% quantile from multiple simulations; 
darker shaded regions denote the 50% quantile; thick lines denote the mean. 
Each of 200 individuals were assigned an incubation and symptomatic period, 
and randomly assigned a time of infection (constrained by the longest combined 
interval) prior to the flight departure. Individuals requiring hospitalization prior 
to departure screening were excluded from screening and boarding within a 
simulation; this process was repeated 1,000 times and summary statistics 
calculated for each journey time.  
